Mumbai confession ‘was coerced.’

There is intense security at the trial at the Arthur Road jail The leading suspect in the Mumbai (Bombay) attacks trial has retracted his confession. The lawyer for the sole surviving suspected gunman, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab, said it was extracted through coercion and force. The prosecution had read out parts of his confession as the trial began and accused him of killing 166 people. Prosecutor Ujwal Nikam said this was a conspiracy hatched in Pakistan to wage war on India. Friday’s opening of the trial followed a number of procedural delays. The latest was on Wednesday when Mr Qasab’s lawyer was sacked for allegedly also signing up to defend a victim. More than 170 people, including nine gunmen, were killed in the attacks last November. ‘Minor’ Mr Qasab, who police say is 21, is charged with murder and waging war on India. He faces the death penalty if convicted. Two Indians, Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed, are also on trial, accused of being members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group and of scouting for the attacks. Mr Nikam opened the prosecution argument, saying the Mr Qasab was responsible for the murder of 166 people. “Even though Qasab was actually not present at the time of the firing incidents in hotels Taj and Trident, and Nariman House, he can be held liable for the murders as one of the co-conspirators,” Mr Nikam said. He said the gunmen had training from “intelligence professionals” but did not at that point mention Pakistan by name. Mr Nikam spoke of a “major general” who had attended the training of the suspects and informed them of the use of the sea route to attack Mumbai. The attackers were told to kill American, British and Israeli nationals as they had caused harm to Muslims, Mr Nikam said. Mr Qasab did not smile or speak. His new lawyer, Abbas Kazmi, claimed Mr Qasab was under 18 years of age and therefore should be tried in a juvenile court. The application was rejected. Mr Kazmi then formally filed for retraction of the confession that was made in front of a magistrate in February. It will be up to the judge to weigh the evidence at the trial and decide whether the confession should be taken into account. Under pressure India has accused Pakistan-based fighters from Lashkar-e-Taiba of carrying out the attacks. Pakistan has admitted they were partly planned on its soil. Mr Qasab was arrested on the first day of the attacks and has been in custody ever since. A huge security operation has been launched for the trial involving hundreds of armed police and soldiers. Proceedings were set to start formally on Wednesday but Mr Qasab’s lawyer, Anjali Waghmare, was dismissed for “professional misconduct”. She was alleged to have also signed up to represent victim Sri Vardhan Kar, but has denied agreeing to represent him. On Thursday the court appointed Mr Kazmi, a top criminal lawyer from Mumbai, to replace her. This case has generated huge interest in India, whose citizens were outraged by what they saw as the inability of their leaders to protect them in November. India’s government is under pressure to deliver results in the case, especially with the first phase of voting in the country’s general elections getting under way on Thursday.

Kasab should be tried in juvenile court: Kazmi

MUMBAI: A special court on Friday dismissed Mumbai terror attack accused Mohammed Ajmal Kasab’s application claiming that he is a “juvenile”. Abbas Kazmi arrives for Kasab’s trial at Arthur Road jail in Mumbai. (AP) More Pictures Lawyer Abbas Kazmi, who is defending Pakistani national Kasab, said his client had told him that he “had not even reached the age of 17″ when the attacks took place last November. “He is still under 18. In such circumstances he is deemed to be a juvenile and this court has no jurisdiction to try this case,” Kazmi told the trial court. “The case should be transferred to the appropriate competent juvenile court. As a juvenile he should be treated as such… we cannot proceed further”. But public prosecutor Ujwal Nikam rejected the submission, saying that in both Kasab’s “confession statement” to the police and on transfer to jail, he had said he was 21″. “On the day of the incident, November 26, 2008, he had completed 21 years, two months and some 13 days,” Nikam said. Judge ML Tahiliyani asked Kasab to stand in the dock and then commented: “As one looks at accused No 1, it does not appear that he is below 17 years.” Rejecting the application, the judge added: “In my considered opinion, the plea is frivolous and intended to delay the trial.” Tahiliyani however did not rule out examining the matter again in the future. Kasab faces a string of charges including “waging war” on India, murder, attempted murder and kidnapping. He faces the death penalty if convicted of taking part in the attacks, which left more than 160 dead and hundreds more wounded.

‘Over 300 doctors’ vacancies in Para-military forces… there was only one doctor with us (in Mumbai)’

•Shekhar Gupta: We come to the Oberoi now, or the Oberoi Trident complex that you might call it. How was this challenge different from what you faced at the Taj?

J K Dutt: You know well over here when the terrorist came, it was again a matter of terrorism personified. They entered into the Khyber restaurant, they shot people indiscriminately and they immediately took ten persons hostages, they took them to the top floor.

•Shekhar Gupta: They basically pushed them up the staircase.

J K Dutt: Yes, they were two of them with their weapons pointing, no body has the ..no body would dare to sort of not do what they were demanding. So, they went up the stairs and at the top floor over there they started shooting at them. Six of them were killed on the spot, four of them played dead.

•Shekhar Gupta: They pretended to be dead.

J K Dutt: They pretended to be dead but they were only injured and in fact when they got the chance later, when the terrorists left that spot they immediately ran to the roof top. Now, at the Khyber, same thing happened. There was a lot of bloodshed over there, when I visited that place, the service lanes, the kitchen, the hotel staff had been attacked, the guests had been attacked; those who were living in the rooms those persons had been attacked and over here when we came again; you see one was that the environment was totally new for the NSG; we did not really know the set up of the hotel. We tried to get the maps; in Taj we were able to get them in the beginning but it took some time before some body could really explain the set up of the rooms. Same thing happened over here, by the time we got the thing here, you know the terrorists had been moving. Only thing that I would say here that we were able to, the marcos over here were also trying to pin them down to one particular place.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, how did you get to the top floor, climbing?

J K Dutt: No, we had a staircase. The emergency staff one. So, from that side we sent up two teams and the one which reached the top from there we started.

•Shekhar Gupta: How big were these teams?

J K Dutt: Enough to take care of the situation they had to deal with.

•Shekhar Gupta: Its not correct to…

J K Dutt: …talk about how many persons there are. It was enough. If we required ore people we would have probably sent in one more hit. Now, hit is the smallest unit which we use.

•Shekhar Gupta: About six people.

J K Dutt: On the 18th floor the shooting started so we knew that hey were over there and over here the terrorists had gone inside a room. 1856, I still remember the room number.

•Shekhar Gupta: It’s a room I have stayed in several times.

J K Dutt: Same room?

•Shekhar Gupta: Yes

J K Dutt: I think there would be now changing the complete inside, it will look absolutely different. Over there they had to almost force the door open and as soon as they forced the door open, there was a firing shooting from inside and one of my commandos was very badly injured. But, even in that condition he kept his presence of mind, he fired back and he killed one terrorist.

•Shekhar Gupta: Did you try to capture anybody alive?

J K Dutt: You see, as I said, one of my objective was to see if we could capture the terroriss alive as far as possible because I all such cases of terrorism, it is very necessary to interrogate the person to find out the links, the set ups, who the operators are, who the leaders are, who their other supporters may be, what their other plans may be? All, a lot of wealth of information can be obtained from them and that is why we were trying to get this. This also if you have two persons, you get a lot of corroborations as well.

•Shekhar Gupta: Yes, because there was Kasab and some body else.

J K Dutt: Yeah, now the thing was that at one or two places, on two or three occasions; this was at the Taj also and also at the Oberoi, you know we did sort of say that you have no chance of getting out of this place alive, you better surrender yourself; at least you life will be saved. But, they would only reply with a string of abuses and they would start shooting from their weapons.

•Shekhar Gupta: String of abuses in Punjabi?

J K Dutt: Well, honestly I didn’t ask my men if it was in English or Punjabi, but I suppose coming from that side probably Punjabi.

•Shekhar Gupta: I am talking in terms of the ethnics…

J K Dutt: Yeah, probably it was that string of choice abuses which one hears in Punjabi. That sort of thing, that was there. After that, of course since that was the answer enough and there was no question of then negotiating or having a negotiator talking to these guys.

•Shekhar Gupta: There was never any negotiation? Any demands ever?

J K Dutt: No, nothing beyond this. They didn’t make any demands at all. But, yes you see in one of the intelligence inputs which I got from Delhi was that there was a telephone call which had been intercepted and apparently this was an international call and it had been diverted through another country.

•Shekhar Gupta: Through the US I believe.

J K Dutt: Yes, and it was mentioned over there that in the Taj there are members of Parliament, that very senior bureaucrats are staying there and if you want you can take any one in your custody as hostage and whatever demand you want you can make.

•Shekhar Gupta: Your injuries- you lost two lives?

J K Dutt: Yes.

•Shekhar Gupta: How many injuries did you suffer?

J K Dutt: Eight of them were hospitalised out of which one of them also had an eye injury which was due to shrapnel from a grenade that went into his eye.

•Shekhar Gupta: That was an officer too?

J K Dutt: This was an officer too.

•Shekhar Gupta: But, I believe progressing well now.

J K Dutt: Yes, given the best of medical treatment we could. In fact, you know I wish we had a few more medical officers with us.

•Shekhar Gupta: I believe NSG is really short of doctors.

J K Dutt: Well, yes the number has come down because over all in the Para-military forces, I believe, there is a vacancy of over 300 doctors. We are just not getting them.

•Shekhar Gupta: Is it true, when you came here at one point with almost 500 men? 200, 150 or 400 men.

J K Dutt: The first lot was 200 men. The lot which came later were much smaller.

•Shekhar Gupta: Then you had two more lots. One came in the afternoon and one came a little bit later. When, you were getting worried that you might have to rotate them.

J K Dutt: Yes, yes.

•Shekhar Gupta: They were in contact with terrorists in three places.

J K Dutt: Three venues yes.

•Shekhar Gupta: In fact they had suffered casualties in three places. They lost two lives.

J K Dutt: In Oberoi, for example, there were only injuries.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, there was combat in three places simultaneously.

J K Dutt: Yes, oh yes simultaneously.

•Shekhar Gupta: And is it true that for all this you had only one doctor on duty.

J K Dutt: Yes, there was only one doctor, one medical officer who was available with us. In fact, I feel that these are the steps which are now being taken. The force is being modernized and equipped with such things.

•Shekhar Gupta: It’s unfortunate that you suffered, say, 10 casualties, 2 killed and 8 wounded… 8 hospitalised. More could’ve got hit. But this could’ve been much worse and one doctor would have been completely…

J K Dutt: Yes, Because when we have three venues, I would have personally liked for each of the three venues one person to be there.

•Shekhar Gupta: Take us now to Nariman House, the third one. What actually became one of the most enduring visuals of the operation. You know those commandos coming down from that helicopter.

J K Dutt: Yes, I think that was the first time an operation like that had been conducted in our country. In fact this entire, the black tornado, this operation against terrorism in Mumbai is the biggest anti terrorist operation which has been conducted in which over 600 hostages were rescued and the number of civilian casualties remained, I was thinking it would probably cross three figures but it remained only in two figures and we lost only two men, the casualties could have been much more. In Nariman house, it was I think you know in which all our training got implemented because over there was a top down insertion that means in that the commandos came from the top. We also had a team which was bottom up. And, we had to make sure, one, there was communication between these two groups and secondly, they did not cross fire at each other.

•Shekhar Gupta: They were being covered by snipers on surrounding buildings.

J K Dutt: Yes, they were being covered and Nariman house as you may have seen, you see its very difficult to get to that building unless you really know the way to that place.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, if you were to make an assessment as an policeman. Forget that you led India’s finest commando force, then your assessment would be that either somebody led them there or…

J K Dutt: or they had visited this place earlier and knew exactly where to go. That is it. And, in fact over there as you know, this is one of the eight places, I believe, in Mumbai where Jews and others do get together. They have their place of worship in that place; they have a little restaurant where the Israeli and Jews come and probably they selected this place because of its proximity to this area.

•Shekhar Gupta: Also proximity to the landing place. So, reconstruct the scene for us at Nariman house.

J K Dutt: Nariman house, well there were terrorists who got in over there; they knew that they would have some foreigners inside, number one. And, number two, these are certain establishments which the terrorists have not been able to hit worldwide and here Nariman house was a target which they could have zeroed in on. This was one. The second is that once they got in over there and the fact that these telephone intercepts you know took place from that building; the person who went over there probably that is the point from which these telephonic exchange was easier, how and why- it may be the grid formation.

•Shekhar Gupta: How and why, you say it may be the?

J K Dutt: You see in some places the connections may be weak, over there may be some facilities available which they had the satellite phones, they had these GPS and other things and over there from there they were able to talk to these men.

•Shekhar Gupta: Their controllers?

J K Dutt: Yes, the only thing again is that there was no demand over there.

•Shekhar Gupta: But, a lot of those conversations were picked up by us.

J K Dutt: Yes, that was there.

•Shekhar Gupta: And, what were those conversations between them and their handlers?

J K Dutt: Well, I think the details would be available with the concerned agency. Hat was of concern to us that was being conveyed to me and we use of it to the extent possible. And, in fact at one time it was suggested that may be I could speak to some body inside and suddenly I got this message don’t try to ring that number, it is that of a terrorist so I didn’t make that call.

•Shekhar Gupta: It is directly…?

J K Dutt: The telephone is with the terrorist. So, my question of talking with the terrorist does not arise so that was the information which we had and now where the operation itself is concerned as I said, it was very peculiar in the sense that we had the slithering..

•Shekhar Gupta: When did you know that you would have to do a top down entry?

J K Dutt: On 27th when I came over here, I had reece the three places and as soon as I saw this Nariman house construction and all the surrounding buildings, I knew we would probably have to use a helicopter. So, I had asked for the helicopter on the 27th itself and the only point which had to be decided was that whether we try for this insertion on 27th itself in the afternoon or on the 28th morning.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, 27th morning is when you have arrived in Bombay?

J K Dutt: Yes, 27th morning we arrived.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, you thought of using the helicopter the same day.

J K Dutt: I knew we that would have to use them and I asked for the helicopters to be made available. So, they were available in Mumbai itself.

•Shekhar Gupta: And, these are not helicopters and pilots that have trained with you?

J K Dutt: No, no not the ones. In fact, the ones who do the slithering, you see the pilot has to be trained in such a way that he is able to hover the aircraft over a particular point.

•Shekhar Gupta: That’s the other question, because it was stiff breeze and a Mi 70 is not known to be the stablest helicopter.

J K Dutt: It’s a very heavy machine and you know every time when one person comes down the load inside the helicopter also changes and the pilot has to be a real expert he should be able to keep the plane absolutely steady. Because a little movement this way or that way, instead of landing on top of the building, the commando may be going 7-8 floors straight down. So, we can’t have that sort of a risk.

•Shekhar Gupta: But, all credit to the pilots that they managed. Because they were not familiar with the site, they were not able to reece the building either.

J K Dutt: Yes, yes, I give full credit to the pilot. No, they didn’t reece. In fact, 28th morning I did an aerial reece and infact at that time we were given information that there was movement of what was said to me was that terrorists are moving on top of Oberoi. So, we did circle this place twice, thrice but I didn’t find any movement. Later on, what we did find was, you know those four hostages…

•Shekhar Gupta: The four survivors…

J K Dutt: Those survivors, they had escaped to the top, they were rescued from there. They had gone and hidden in some boilers which were not operating at that time. So, they were rescued from there, so probably some body might have got information or some body might have waved from there and some one from this height thought that they were terrorists. So, that was the information.

•Shekhar Gupta: Lets conclude the Nariman house operation.

J K Dutt: Yes, now the second terrorist was still inside.

•Shekhar Gupta: One, Gajyendra Singh hit..

J K Dutt: One, Gajyendra Singh had hit, that person was a casualty. That terrorist was killed. There was now shooting taking place, you see how do we know, the intensity of fire changes; once the intensity of fire changes, there are two alternatives. Either the person, the terrorist has stopped shooting for some reason or he is a casualty. So, here we were able to assume that he is a casualty because the way the exchange had taken place we knew we had got one person, the other person was still hiding inside. Again, the layout was not known; in Nariman house we did not even have the plan of the building with us. So, where exactly was he hiding really wasn’t known and the second time when we had to get in we had to blow a hole into the side of the wall and from there we were then able to then lob in our grenades and do some shooting. That is when we got the second terrorist. They were just two of them, after that the shooting stopped completely. So, we knew that alright both these persons had been neutralised.

•Shekhar Gupta: Tell me, in this helicopter operation, there has been some criticism of it internationally that one, it was a very big helicopter. Another of course that the media was not requested to keep it off live v screens because even if terrorists were not watching here the handlers were watching elsewhere. Do you believe they were also telling them to kill hostages at Nariman house?

J K Dutt: Yes, in fact what we did get was that there were two women in Nariman house who had been secured with ropes, their hands and feet had been tied. This was the input which I’d got later that they said that one of them was making a lot of noise. This was before the NSG arrived. So, the order came- finish her.

•Shekhar Gupta: From the handlers?

J K Dutt: Yes, must have been from the handlers. So, that sort of a thing did happen. Yes.

•Shekhar Gupta: But, you didn’t find those bodies battered or beaten up, molested?

J K Dutt: No, again it’s a matter of the investigating agencies and the medico legal opinion which would be able to confirm it but visibly we didn’t find any signs of molestation.

•Shekhar Gupta: But there was also a challenge of landing on a very small rooftop in a very congested area. Were you confident that you people were trained to land on buildings, narrow buildings?

J K Dutt: Oh yes, yes in fact I was absolutely confident that the commandos would be able to do it. Because you know about when I joined the NSG at that time the slithering used to take place on to the ground. And I wanted that they should be able to do it on top of a building also, if need be. So, I talked to the men concerned, I said how can we improve and incorporate this sort of thing into our operation? They said, Sir we can do slithering on top of a building. So, the first time I did it, we did this slithering was on the 10 meter diving board of the swimming pool at Manesar. So, we landed on a platform which was hardly about 10 feet by 6 feet. After that we have done it on some of the structures which we have at Manesar, which we use during the raising day demos and then last year when we had SAARC, at that time we had our chaps, commandos exercising and landing on top of Vigyan Bhawan.

•Shekhar Gupta: Oh, you did.

J K Dutt: Yes, we did. In fact at that time we didn’t know. We had of course sent out the due cautionaries you know notes and things that we will be practicing and doing this but there was a preparation meeting going on inside and all these… some of the delegates and others who were meeting inside rushed out and said what is happening? Something has gone wrong over here? And we told them no, no it’s just an exercise which we are doing here. Same thing we also did at the Oberoi, not the Oberoi sorry at the Taj and the Maurya.

•Shekhar Gupta: In Delhi?

J K Dutt: In Delhi. So, they had done the slithering on top of these building. So, they were used to that.

•Shekhar Gupta: There were many equipments that commando forces around the world have or anti terrorist forces, which would have made your life easier.

J K Dutt: I was asked a very interesting question by a journalist. He asked me, he says if you had to do this operation all over again, is there any way that you could have done it in a better way? Now, it is a loaded question and I thought about it. And, the honest answer is yes. It could have been improved upon, if we had certain other type of equipment.

•Shekhar Gupta: One more question that comes up because this was the first genuinely televised commando operation. Why did you not use gas to knock them off?

J K Dutt: Well, no. We have had this operation in U.K, that was televised. The world center, the twin towers, parts of it were shown and parts of it were not telecast.

•Shekhar Gupta: But this was a commando operation.

J K Dutt: Yes, in this operation quite a bit was shown.

•Shekhar Gupta: Why didn’t you use gas? You could have captured some alive.

J K Dutt: You see gas is something which one has to use very very carefully. We have, firstly only, at present to my knowledge, there is one example of use of gas and this was inside a theatre in Russia.

•Shekhar Gupta: And that was a botch up.

J K Dutt: It had terrible consequences. You see, in a place where there are hostages. In a place like hotel, where you have grown ups, old people, children, everyone around. Ladies, women, there may be some one who is pregnant also.

•Shekhar Gupta: Or some body might have asthma.

J K Dutt: There may be asthmatic, cardiac patients, what effect this gas will have. Instead of having trying to get over the terrorists, we may be causing unnecessary casualties.

•Shekhar Gupta: But, you had gas available to you?

J K Dutt: Yes, we had gas grenades and gas shells. We did have those but I thought it would be advisable not to use them.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, I know that you must have done your reports with the government and you will obviously not talk about them but can I generally say that as a result of this we might get, in terms of the professionals that you commanded, better body armour, better communication equipment as you said these things resting on the cheekbone instead of it being inside the ear.

J K Dutt: Bullet proof vests, helmets, different equipments.

•Shekhar Gupta: And better surveillance equipment?

J K Dutt: Yes, I think we will not only get this but much more because these are the types of equipment which are you know evolving, there are new things coming up and all this for ensuring what the NSG calls Sarvatar Sarvotam Suraksha.

•Shekhar Gupta: So, you have received the compliments and congratulations of the whole country, so it’s my privilege to also have this opportunity to congratulate you, personally.

J K Dutt: Thank you. It was all a part of our duty.

•Shekhar Gupta: It was wonderful to have conversation with you and for you to spare so much time. And also a bit chastening because we are finishing this conversation almost where Kasab and his partner Ismail Khan landed.

J K Dutt: I will say not Kasab, I think this is where terrorism stopped.

‘We were able to account for seven and were looking for the eighth terrorist… our dogs smelt out the body, beneath burnt furniture’

•We are in front of a landmark (Taj Hotel, Mumbai) that will remain imprinted in our memories for the harrowing times we had watching it on television for three-and-a-half days. My guest this week is J K Dutt, former Director General of the National Security Guard, under whose command the siege was brought to a logical conclusion and a bloody one. Welcome to Walk the Talk.

It’s nice to be here with you.

•It’s also sobering to be here.

Very much.

•It’s also wonderful to have you speaking for the first time on what happened.

This is something that has given me a sense of accomplishment at the time of my retirement. In fact, I would say that Operation Black Tornado was almost a vindication of all the…

•…There was only one operation.

Yes. Surprisingly, the media at that time had said that there is an Operation Cyclone, an Operation Weather Storm. But the entire operation at Nariman House, Oberoi and Taj hotels was Operation Black Tornado.

•Tell us how it started.

I was watching television and the first thing I heard on the news was that there was some gang war. But from the way the shooting was going on and some of the shots they were showing, I could make out that this was a terrorist attack. I immediately asked my commandos to get ready and soon after that I received a call from the Cabinet Secretary saying that probably the NSG will be required and the team should be ready. As soon as that happened, I felt we should move our men to the airport.

•How fast does it happen in the NSG?

We give them 30 minutes to prepare. Once the alert has been sounded, they come, collect their weapons and other equipment, and proceed to the vehicles. It takes about 30 minutes for that. All other equipment is loaded in the vehicle and they go to the airport. The NSG is situated at Manesar, which is 35-40 km from the airport and, depending on the traffic, it takes almost an hour or more to reach the technical area.

•The technical area is the one which the Air Force uses at Palam airport.

Yes. The vehicles were ready and the men got into them. By the time the request came from the state Government to the Home Ministry, the men were already on the move. Then, the question of having an aircraft arose. The aircraft, an IL-76, which can carry 200 persons with ammunition, was available.

•What happened at that time? The plane did not come from Chandigarh?

No, the aircraft was available at the Indira Gandhi International airport and we were ready by 2.10 am. Then, we were told that the aircraft will take off at 2.20 am. Once the men are inside and the hatch is closed, the aircraft begins its checklist of switching on, etc, and that takes about 25-30 minutes. Even a helicopter takes 10-15 minutes to warm up. We took off from New Delhi at 3 am and by 5 am we were here.

•How much did you know at that time?

We knew that three places had been attacked. TV had also told us about the attacks at Leopold Café, VT station, Cama Hospital. By the time we left, it had more or less got confined to the Taj, Oberoi, and Nariman House. We looked upon it as three venues. It was only after we came here that we realised that it is not just Taj Heritage but also Taj Tower and we also have the Oberoi along with the Trident.

•You were not particularly familiar with Mumbai.

No.

•When you were with the CBI, you used to keep raiding government officers here.

That was a different job altogether. By the time we came here, it was almost like five venues and our operation started with the Trident.

•The time lag between your getting the orders and your troops getting to these places could have been shortened?

There are two ways of looking at it. One, if you look at the time when the terrorists attacked, that will be around 9 pm or 2100 hours of November 26, and as I mentioned, first they thought it was a gang war. It was only later that they confirmed that this was an act by terrorists and once that happened the state machinery got into motion. They had to get the clearance from the Chief Minister who requisitioned the NSG. We started our operation on November 27 at 9 am. But if you look at it from the time that we took off from Delhi after we had received orders for moving to this place, then we got the order at about 1 am and by 3 am we were in the aircraft, by 5 am we were here, by 9 am the operation had started. I had been able to talk to the DG Maharashtra and they had lined up all the vehicles we required.

•Was he holding his nerve or was he shaken?

He was quite in control of himself. Probably, the ATS was hard hit and the situation was becoming more and more difficult for the local authorities to deal with.

•If the ATS had not lost its top brass, maybe they would have reacted better?

It’s difficult to talk in ‘ifs’ in a situation like this. The strength of the ATS is also not very large. The training that is required, the mental makeup of the men, the weapons they use, the fire power that is required in an operation like this — probably all that was not available. Last year, in our country there were only one or two forces which were equipped with all sorts of things. The Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh, for example, have that sort of capability and have been trained by the NSG. Since Operation Black Tornado, we have been receiving requests from almost all the states to train their men. We have to set up the hubs as quickly as possible. Hubs are coming up in Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai. The hubs should be as close to the airport as possible. We also need firing ranges, obstacle courses, auditoriums, training areas.

•What was it that you first saw when you came here?

In the aircraft, I had briefed my officers. I told them that we must ensure that there is no loss of innocent lives, no hostages. Second, we should try and keep the collateral damage to the minimum. Third, we try to take the terrorists alive. Fourth, once we leave the place it should be safe for others to use it, no unused grenades that can go off injuring innocent persons. When we came here, we had to dissipate the force a bit to get in another contingent from Delhi. Once the second team was with us, we were able to launch a full-scale operation. The Mumbai Police already had Kasab in their custody. He had been examined and from him, we were able to get information that there were at least 10 terrorists. There was also speculation regarding local contacts. This information was being verified by certain agencies. The NSG is only meant for conducting operations, engaging terrorists and neutralising them. Like the celestial Sudarshan Chakra, we go in quickly and get out, we don’t linger around any operation.

•That’s the symbolism behind the Sudarshan Chakra?

Yes. The celestial weapon can cut through anything and when it meets with resistance, its speed increases.

•When the NSG went in, did you worry that there might be more people inside?

Yes. We have instances where terrorists booby-trap dead bodies. Those are the first things one tries to remove, and when one is trying to do that, it can cause an explosion. Inputs were given to us by the state force and the intelligence department. We had to separate terrorists from guests and the hostages, because as long as these persons were together, to some extent there could be casualties. We found that the rooms had been set on fire. On the second day, I realised that this was a diversion tactic. They came under pressure and set a room on fire, as that gave them time to reload, rest, recuperate and eat. They were highly trained terrorists and not just picked up, given rudimentary training for a few days, and sent off to conduct an operation like this. We had a few instances where the firemen came face to face with the terrorists. Surprisingly, though the terrorists were killing anyone they saw, they did not fire at the firemen. This was one thing we took advantage of.

•Did you change your tactics once you discovered that they were using fire to escape and to recover from pressure?

Twice, I had a re-look at my tactics. One was when I lost Major Unnikrishnan at the Taj. He took a very big risk. Risk-taking cannot be taught, for a person acts out of emotion at that time and if the emotional bank account is high, he will risk anything.

•What exactly happened with Major Unnikrishnan?

The terrorists were on the first floor near the landing and they were shooting from the staircase. They were positioned on the landing on the first floor. They had engaged the NSG team and when they advanced, one of the commandos was injured and fell down the staircase. Unnikrishnan, along with his team, immediately rushed to rescue him. Unnikrishnan was right in front. He was able to rescue the man and hand him over to his team mates. The fire was coming from the landing. He decided to go after the terrorists alone. His buddy was taking care of the injured person.

•That’s not exactly your training. The training is that two should be together as far as possible. A buddy pair should not break.

Yes, but a situation like this has its demands and opportunities that can be exploited. I think that’s what Unnikrishnan did. Had Unnikrishnan succeeded, probably the entire operation would have been terminated much faster. He went up to the first floor and from there he was able to engage the terrorists. At that time, the number of terrorists was not known. We knew there were two, but there was, in fact, a third one inside a room. When Unnikrishnan was chasing one of the terrorists who was trying to retreat, he came in front of the room where the third terrorist was hiding and that, unfortunately, got him. There was nothing wrong in the tactics. Here was an NSG commando, who was acting beyond the call of duty. Every time, an operation takes place, one thinks that nothing will happen to me and one casualty occurs then others think, it can be me next time. It was very necessary that even while the shooting was going on I visit the place. My commandos and officers were able to push the terrorists out, we went to that landing. I found there was nothing wrong with the tactics and quietly the word was spread that this person (Unnikrishnan) has sacrificed his life and it will not be wasted.

•This was effectively your first contact with the terrorists.

Yes.

•At the Oberoi, the fighting was much more intense.

At the Oberoi, though there were only two terrorists, the fighting was very intense because they were using high-explosive grenades, AK-47s. Each terrorist was armed with two weapons — AK 47 and .9 mm Chinese pistol — and of course, the hand grenades were there. They had a number of spare magazines. If these terrorists had wanted, they could have prolonged the operation. On the 29th, we had got the Nariman House and the Oberoi under our control. At the Taj, when I found out the tactic of setting fire was being used, I told my men that as soon as the fire is out they must enter the place and spring a surprise on the terrorists by firing first. Till then, it was only single shots that were being fired.

•Why would you use single shots? You were not short of ammunition?

We were not short of ammunition, but the question was that of collateral damage. There was no point shooting at shadows.

•When you figured out that setting fire was a tactic, did you decide to use overwhelming fire-power?

One, we decided not to allow these persons to get out. Secondly, when the firemen were dousing the fire from outside, our persons were already in different passages. The only thing we did not know about was the spiral steel staircase inside. We knew that some structure was there, but we were told very late that it is actually a staircase. I must say this building is absolutely strong, and bullets hardly had any effect on the foundation. We went in for the burst fire and that’s when I think we were able to neutralise all of them.

•When did you know that they were all cornered in one place?

After the fire had been put out and we had mounted the assault, 20 minutes after that one of the terrorists had fallen and then there was silence, there was no return fire. We knew then that they have either been neutralised or they may have changed positions. And when we went in, we found three bodies, two of them near the staircase. I got in touch with the IB over the phone and asked the Director, ‘Look, how many terrorists are we supposed to account for?’. The rooms had to be checked. I did not want to open a door, someone could come out shooting and we could have had unnecessary casualties. Over 600 hostages had been rescued and we lost two men. Eight terrorists had been killed. The IB Director said we had to account for 10, out of which Kasab was already in custody and one of the terrorists had been killed by the police. We were able to account for seven and were looking for the eighth terrorist. I told my men to be very cautious. We sent in our dog squad to look at the grenades and other things lying around which had to be defused. The dogs smelt out the body of the terrorist, it was covered with burnt furniture. They found the body and when we cleared all the debris we found the weapon, an AK-47.

•So, dogs were also flown out with your first batch?

Yes, we brought one dog in the first batch and another one or two came in the second flight.

•This was just one-third of the operation that you had undertaken. Let’s also take a look at the Oberoi — that’s an operation which did not get so much of attention.

I think that is because at the Oberoi, the media was kept at a little distance. I would say even the media had taken a risk by being here.

Mumbai, Apr 16 (PTI) Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone arrested member of the 10 men Lashkar-e-Taiba squad that wreaked havoc in Mumbai last year could now be tried for 166 counts of murder, special public prosecutor Ujwal Nikam said today.
The prosecution in the 26/11 case has sought for Kasab to be charged under 166 separate counts of murder along with the two other accused Faheem Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed.

Nikam told the special sessions court that Kasab is responsible for the murder of 166 persons who lost their lives in the three-day terror carnage on November 26 and thus the charge under Section 302 of IPC is required to be framed against him 166 times.

“Even though Kasab was actually not present at the time of the firing incidents in hotels Taj and Trident, and Nariman House, he can be held liable for the murders as one of the co-conspirators,” Nikam told PTI.

Kasab is currently lodged in a high-security special cell in the Arthur Road jail here where he is being guarded round the clock by a strong posse of nearly 300 special commandos of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police.

The trial is long awaited since the Mumbai police filed a voluminous charge sheet of over 11,000 pages.

Kasab, who today got a new lawyer S G Abbas Kazmi, has asked for a Pakistani lawyer to defend him after the judge yesterday removed Anjali Waghmare as his counsel on a complaint of professional misconduct. PTI

Abbas Kazmi appointed as Kasab’s new lawyer

The court has appointed another lawyer for lone surviving gunman in Mumbai terror attack case, Mohammed Amir Ajmal Kasab. Abbas Kazmi has been appointed as Kasab’s new lawyer.

Kazmi is a well known name in the legal circle. He is a private lawyer and not from the legal aid panel and has met the accused.

Kasab on Wednesday requested a special court that a Pakistani lawyer be appointed to defend him after the judge revoked his order appointing Anjali Waghmare as the militant’s counsel.

Kasab told Judge M L Tahilyani that he had earlier written a letter to Pakistan Embassy seeking legal assistance. However, the court said that there has been no response from the Pakistan Embassy.

Kasab replied that he would like to try again for a lawyer and Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam said his request would be conveyed through proper diplomatic channel.

However, the judge said he would not wait for a response from Pakistan and would take a final decision on Kasab’s lawyer on Thursday.

“Considering the nature of the case and its magnitude, to ensure a just and fair trial to Kasab, it was necessary to appoint a lawyer who could handle the case properly,” he said.

Judge Tahilyani said the court will send a message to the President of Bar Association asking if any lawyer, not from the Legal Aid panel, was ready to represent Kasab.

The costs for this would be borne by the state, he said.

Appointment of Ajmal’s lawyer revoked by court

Mumbai: In a sudden twist to the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks case, the special court at the Arthur Road Jail on Wednesday revoked the appointment of Anjali Waghmare, defence lawyer for Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone gunman captured alive.

The court ruled against Ms. Waghmare on the premise that she was silent about her representation of a 26/11 victim in a compensation case, at the time of her appointment as Ajmal’s lawyer on March 30.

The victim (in the Cama Hospital attack) is also a witness in the case. Judge M.L. Tahaliyani noted that there had been ample opportunity for Ms. Waghmare to disclose to the court that she was representing the victim.

He said he had specifically asked her if the victim was a witness and she had replied in the nagative. However, the charge sheet lists him as a witness.

On Wednesday, email communication between the victim and Ms. Waghmare was produced before the court. Ms. Waghmare conceded to having prepared a draft for the victim, but maintained that she had received no case briefing.

Apart from the ground of non-disclosure, Mr. Tahaliyani observed, the interests of the victim and the accused clashed, thus compromising the propriety of Ms. Waghmare’s appointment. It did not appear appropriate to continue Ms. Waghmare for accused number one [Ajmal], the judge said.

Advocate K.P. Pawar, who was appointed to assist Ms. Waghmare, will, however, continue in the case.

Ms. Waghmare’s appointment from Maharashtra’s legal aid panel was challenged by advocate K.B.N. Lam last week.

He questioned her impartiality on the ground that despite being defence counsel, she had contact with a prosecution witness.

India accuses Pakistan of indulging in delaying tactics in Mumbai attacks case

NEW DELHI, April 14 (Xinhua) — India has accused Pakistan of indulging in delaying tactics after Pakistan Monday sought more information from New Delhi on Mumbai terror attacks last November.

“We have given sufficient evidence to Pakistan to act against identified masterminds. By delaying action and raising technicalities, Pakistan would be undermining the credibility of its own commitments to take tangible action,” Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma told the media Monday night.

The minister said that delaying tactics would only raise doubts on Islamabad’s intention to bring the perpetrators of Mumbai terror attacks to justice.

“Delaying tactics and invoking purely technical issues would only put a question mark on the sincerity and intent of Pakistan,” he said.

Pakistan Monday said that the information provided by India in the Mumbai terror attacks case is not sufficient and it wanted more details to carry forward the probe in the right direction.

Over 170 people, including some foreign nationals, were killed and hundreds injured in the Mumbai attacks.

“The information being sought from India is in the spirit of cooperation with Indian authorities and with a view to enabling the relevant authorities in Pakistan to proceed further in the matter,” a Pakistan Foreign Office statement said on Monday.

India says it has answered all the questions about the Mumbai attacks to Pakistan and thus wants the latter to punish those responsible for the attacks.

Mumbai attacks: Fifth suspect in custody, says Pak

Islamabad (PTI): Pakistan on Monday announced the arrest of a fifth suspect in the Mumbai attacks, who facilitated the financial transactions and planning of the audacious terror strike.

Interior Ministry Chief Rehman Malik, while seeking more information from India on the November 26 attacks, said Pakistan has arrested Karachi-based Shahid Jamil Riaz for facilitating monetary transactions.

Lashkar-e Taiba Operations Commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and other LeT operatives Zarar Shah, Abu al-Qama and Hamad Amin Sadiq are in custody of Pakistani authorities.

Mr. Malik said Pakistan’s probe into the Mumbai incident is continuing and another suspect, Riaz, had been arrested for facilitating monetary transactions in Karachi and planning the attacks.

Mr. Malik, however, did not give further details about Riaz.

Pak seeks more info on Mumbai to proceed further in probe

Islamabad, Apr 13 (PTI) Pakistan today formally asked India to provide further information and clarifications regarding the Mumbai attacks to enable its authorities to “proceed further” in their investigation into the terrorist assault that killed nearly 180 people.

India’s acting High Commissioner Manpreet Vohra was called to the foreign ministry, where the Director General (South Asia) handed over a document “seeking further clarifications (and) evidence from the government of India,” said a statement from the Foreign Office spokesman.

The clarifications and evidence are needed for “the ongoing investigations in Pakistan relating to the Mumbai terror attacks,” it said.

“The information being sought from India is in the spirit of cooperation with Indian authorities and with a view to enabling the relevant authorities in Pakistan to proceed further in the matter,” the statement said.

The statement said Pakistan had also requested replies to some queries it had raised earlier and to which India had not yet responded. It did not give details about these queries.

Pakistan said it was hopeful that “Indian authorities will provide the information requested as soon as possible”. PTI